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MIGRATION AS 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: 
THE ECONOMIC GAINS FROM 
THE LIBERALIZED MOVEMENT 
OF LABOR 
Howard F. Chang 
* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
S ince multilateral trade negotiatiOns produced the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATTY in Geneva in 1 947, the 
world has made dramatic progress toward free trade in goods .  Several 
subsequent rounds of negotiations under the GATT have steadily 
l iberal ized international trade, and numerous regional initiatives seek 
to deepen economic integration among countries prepared to go 
further. Standard economic theory prescribes free trade as the regime 
that max1m1zes global econom1c welfare. Economists also 
Copyright© 1 998 by Howard F. Chang 
' 
Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law School; Visiting Professor of 
Law, Stan ford Law School .  Parts of this articl e  have appeared previously in Howard F. 
Chang, Liberali:::ed immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the Optimal 
Immigration Policy, 1 45 U. PA. L .  REv. 1 1 47 ( 1 997). I wish to thank participants at the 
UCLA symposium and at workshops at Stanford Law School, the University of Michigan 
Law School, and the Duke University School of Law for useful comments. 
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30. 1 947, 6 1  Stat. pt. 5 ,  55 U .N.T .S .  1 87 
[hereinafter GATT]. 
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recommend trade liberalization as a policy that is likely to produce 
gains for each country. 
The gains from trade arise from the fact that different countries 
wil l  produce various goods at different costs. When countries restrict 
trade, the price of a good wil l  be low in countries that can produce the 
good at low cost, but its price wil l  be high in countries that can 
produce the good only at higher cost. Liberalized trade allows both 
countries to gain: the high-price country can import the good at a price 
less than it what it would cost to produce the good at home; the low­
price country can export the good and receive a higher price than it 
would otherwise fetch. 
Precisely the same theory applied to trade in goods also applies to 
trade in services. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
recognized this fact in 1 994, extending the international regulation of 
trade to service markets through the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) . "  Free trade in all services, including labor services, 
would imply free movement of people across borders. To provide 
many services, workers must cross borders to where the work must be 
performed, either on a temporary basis or to accept permanent 
employment. Thus, the free movement of workers across borders 
promotes economic welfare by promoting free trade in the labor 
market. The European Union recognizes the importance of free 
mobil i ty of labor as an element of a comprehensive free trade regime,  
enshrining this freedom in i ts  constitution as one of the "four 
freedoms" that are the basic pi l lars of the European common market, 
"an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured. "3 This "freedom of 
movement for workers" in tum entails "the abol ition of any 
2 General Agreement on Trade in Services. Apr. 15, 1994. 33 l. L. M. 1 16 7 [hereinafter 
GATS). For a summary of the GATS, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE 
REGULATION OF I NTERNATIONAL TRADE 225-36 (1995) ,  Bernard Hoekman, The General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS: CASES. MATERIALS .WD TEXT 92 1 (John H. Jackson et al., eds., 3 d  ed.  1995 ), or 
P ierre Sauve, Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services--Half-Full or Half­
Empty.?. J. WORLD TRADE. Aug. 1995, at 125. 
3 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY MAR. 25 ,  1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. II, art. 8A (as amended i n  1987), art . 7A (as amended in  1992 ) 
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discrimination based on nationality between workers . . .  with respect to 
employment."4 
Immigration barriers interfere with the free flow of labor 
internationally and thereby cause wage rates for the same c lass of 
labor to diverge widely among different countries .  For any given class 
of labor, residents of high-wage countries could gain by employing 
more immigrant labor, and residents of low-wage countries could gain 
by sel ling more of their labor to employers in high-vvage countries .  
Economic efficiency in the global labor market would cal l  for 
unrestricted migration, which would allow labor to move freely to the 
country where it earns the highest return. Market forces would thus 
direct labor to the market where its marginal product is highest. Given 
the large international differences in wages, it should be apparent that 
the potential gains from international trade in labor (and the costs we 
bear as a result of  immigration barriers) are large . 
Indeed, studies suggest that the gains to the world economy from 
removing immigration barriers could well  be enormous and greatly 
exceed the gains from removing trade barriers . For example, Bob 
Hamilton and John Whalley provide estimates that suggest that the 
gains from free migration of labor would more than double worldwide 
real income, indicating that immigration controls "are one of the (and 
perhaps the) most important policy issues facing the global 
economy."5 Even their most conservative estimate suggests that the 
gains would be a significant fraction (over thirteen percent) of 
worldwide real income.6 Furthermore, their analysis indicates that the 
free migration of labor would also greatly improve the global 
distribution of income by raising real wages dramatical ly  for the 
world's poorest workers . 7 
Recognizing the importance of immigration barriers as costly trade 
barriers, developing countries, especial ly India, have pressed for 
liberalized movement of labor as part of the liberalization of world 
trade in services.  India, with the support of the Philippines, Egypt, 
4 /d. at art. 48(2) .  
5 Bob Hamilton & John Whal ley. Efficienc.v and Distributional Implications of Global 
Restrictions on Labour ivlobility, 1 4  J. DEV. ECON. 6 1 ,  70 ( 1 984 ). 
6 See id at 7 1 -72. 
7 See id at 73-74. 
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Brazil, and Pakistan, has threatened to block progress on the 
l iberal ization of trade in financial services in the absence of progress 
on the "movement of natural persons," which is the subj ect of a 
paral lel  set of negotiations in  the World Trade Organization (WT0) . 8  
In  spite of the large efficiency gains that l iberalized immigration 
policies would produce, however, the authors of the GATS were 
careful to avoid imposing any obligations with respect to immigration 
policies.9 
Indeed, in  1 995 the U . S .  Commission on Immigration Reform, 
headed by Barbara Jordan, urged Congress to move radical ly in the 
opposite direction, toward more restrictive immigration laws. 10 The 
Jordan Commission recommended sweeping changes i n  longstanding 
U . S .  immigration laws, including a reduction in the overal l level of 
legal immigration i nto the United States by one-third.'' The proposed 
changes included permanent cuts in both employment-based and 
fami ly-based immigration. 1 2  These proposals would entail the most 
restrictive changes in U . S .  immigration law since immigration quotas 
were first introduced in 1 92 1 .'3 President B i l l  Clinton i mmediately 
3 See India Warns of Financial Services Link to Free Flow of Labor in Negotiations, 12 
I n t ' l Trade Rep. (BNA) 649 (Apr. 12, 1995); Financial Services Committee Approves Accord 
Without US. 1 2  Int' l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1 3 1 1 ,  1 3 1 1  (Aug. 2, 1995). 
9 See GATS, supra note 2.  Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services 
Under the Agreement, para. 2. 33  I . L. M .  1187. 1187 [hereinafter GATS Annex] ("The 
Agreement shall not apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to the 
employment market of a Member, nor shal l it apply to measures regard ing c i t izenship, 
residence or employment on a permanent basis .") .  
10 See U.S .  COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM. LEGAL IMMIGRATION: SETTING PRIORITIES 
( 1995) [hereinafter JORDAN COMM'N). 
11 See id, at x i i; Robert Pear, Change of Policy on US Immigrants Is Urged by Panel, 
N.Y .  TIMES, June 5, 1995, at A I .  
12 The Jordan Commission proposed permanent reductions in  the numerical  l im its for 
employment-based admissions (from 140,000 to I 00,000 per year) and for fam i ly-based 
admissions (from 480,000 to 400,000 per year). See JORDAN COMM'N. supra note I 0, at x i i .  
The Commission also proposed the  complete e l im ination of a l l  fami ly-based i mmigration 
categories other than nuclear fam i ly  admissions. See id at xvi i i . 
13 Immigration quotas are a relative ly recent innovation: the Un i ted States d id  not 
i ntroduce quantitative restr ict ions on immigrat ion unt i l  1921. See Act of May 19, 192 L ch. 8, 
§2(a), 42 Stat. 5, 5. Thus, for most of our h istory, the Un ited States admitted immigrants 
without numerical l i m its. 
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endorsed these proposals .  1 4  Senator Alan Simpson and Representative 
Lamar Smith, both Republicans, soon introduced bil l s  to implement 
the Jordan Commission' s  recommendations .  15 These radical cuts in 
legal immigration proved controversial ,  however, and after heated 
debate, both the House of Representatives and the Senate ultimately 
voted to exclude these cuts from their immigration reform bil l s .  16 
Nevertheless, the Commission reiterated its restrictionist 
recommendations in its 1 997 report to Congress, 1 7  and observers 
expect restrictionists in Congress to revive their efforts to implement 
these proposals in the near future . 18 
The Commission asserted that its proposals would serve "the 
national interest," citing a recent report that it had commissioned from 
the National Research Council ,  19 which presents the most thorough 
analysis of the economic effects of immigration conducted so far .  Yet 
as Commissioner Warren Leiden observed in his statement dissenting 
from the Jordan Commission' s  proposal to reduce legal immigration, 
the Commission "can provide no convincing argument for this drastic 
reduction" because "there is no objective basis for a drastic 
reduction."20 In fact, as this article wil l show, the application of trade 
principles to immigration law, together with the results of the 
Council's empirical analysis, suggests instead that specific liberalizing 
reforms, which are likely to increase levels of employment-based and 
family-based immigration by eliminating certain immigration barriers, 
14 See Robert Pear. Clinton Embraces a Proposal to Cut Immigration by a Third, N.Y .  
TIMES, June 8 ,  1 995, a t  B I 0. 
15 See H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. (1995) (the Smith bil l); S .  1394, 104th Cong. (1995) (the 
S impson bi l l ) . 
16 See House Approves Immigration Bill After Removing Legal Immigration Restrictions, 
73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 349 (Mar. 25 ,  1996); Senate Approves Omnibus Immigration Bill 
After Removing £->:elusion Provisions, 73 I NTERPRETER RELEASES 60 I (May 6, 1 996 ). 
17 See U. S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION 
AND IMMIGRANT POLICY, at xv i i ,  59 ( 1 997) (here inafter C IR). 
18 See W i l l i am Branigin,  immigration Issues Await New Congress. Surging Legal Influx 
Will Be Among Topics of Renewed Debate. WASH. POST, N ov. 1 8, 1 996, at A I .  
19 See C I R, supra note 1 7, at 59 (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW 
AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION (James P. 
Smith & Barry Edmonston eds. ,  1 997) [hereinafter N RC]) .  
20 JORDAN COMM'N, supra note 1 0, at 229. 
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would raise national economic welfare as wel l  as global economic 
welfare. 
Given the importance of economic concerns in the public debate 
over immigration policy, I wil l  focus on the implications of 
immigration for economic wel fare .  Although the economic theory 
that I use applies to any country of immigration, I wi l l  focus on the 
United States as my central example, taking the empirical evidence 
regarding immigration into the United States and deriving policy 
implications for the United States in particular. In  particular, this 
article wil l  begin with a focus on immigration for the purpose of 
employment, because it i s  largely j ustified on economic grounds ,  
although the analysis wil l  have implications for immigration in  
general. I wi l l  use the term "immigration" in a broad sense, including 
not only the admission of aliens for permanent res idence (on 
"immigrant" visas) but also the admission of guest-workers on a more 
temporary basis (on what are called "nonimmigrant" visas in  the 
United States).2 1 Thus, I wil l  focus on the issue of admission to the 
labor market of the host country, which does not necessari l y  imply 
access to c itizenship in the host country. 
Before reaching any conclusions regarding the optimal level of  
immigration, one must specify the criterion by which one wi l l  evaluate 
the effects of immigration. To shed l ight on our immigration laws, I 
wil l  explore what policies would be optimal from the perspective of 
economic welfare. In evaluating the effects of immigration policies 
upon economic welfare, however, we must first address  the question 
of whose welfare we are considering. Should we seek to maximize the 
welfare of natives (those born in the country of immigration) alone? 
Should we seek to maximize national economic wel fare or global 
economic welfare? Once we decide whose welfare counts, we must 
also address whether our obj ective is merely  to maximize their wealth 
(that is, to pursue economic efficiency with respect to their welfare) or 
our obj ectives also include an equitable distribution of wealth among 
them. If our objectives include distributive concerns,  then our 
21 U.S. law creates numerous categories of "nonimmigrant"' al iens admitted to the U n ited 
States on a temporary basis. 8 U.S .C .  § I I O I (a)( l 5 ) ( 1994). These categories inc lude not 
on ly  students. see id § I I  0 I (a)( 15 )(F), and temporary visitors for business or  p leasure, see id 
§ I I O I (a)( l 5 )(8). for example, but also temporary workers. see id § I I O I (a)( I 5 )( H ). 
I 
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measure of social welfare must specify how much weight to give these 
concerns. Thus, the optimal po l icy will depend upon what measure of 
social welfare we choose to maximize. 
I will not in this artic le set forth a philosophical defense of any 
particular welfare objective . Instead, my strategy wi l l  be to examine 
what policies the United States would pursue if its goal were simply to 
maximize the economic welfare of U .S .  natives, not because I believe 
that immigration policy should be guided solely by considerations of 
economic self-interest, but because such concerns have in fact played 
a dominant role  in the public debate over immigration policy. National 
governments, including the U .S. government, wil l  probably continue 
to deem the promotion of the interests of natives as the paramount 
objective of immigration policies. I derive the optimal policy given 
that objective as a theoretical exercise, not because this welfare 
objective is  moral ly defensible, but because this objective is 
commonly thought to provide a strong case in  favor of restrictive 
immigration l aws. 
This thought experiment reveals, however, that even from this 
narrow perspective, which "stacks the deck" against the immigrant, 
optimal policies would probably allow higher levels  of employment­
based and family-based immigration than current U . S .  immigration 
laws permit .  Even if  we give zero weight to the wel fare of aliens in 
our measure of social welfare, the optimal immigration policy would 
be more l iberal than our current laws in most important respects . In 
particular, although the economic welfare of natives and distributive 
justice among natives are often advanced as reasons to reduce 
immigration, I wil l  demonstrate that neither obj ective provides a 
sound justification for more restrictive laws regarding employment­
based and fami ly-based immigration. 
In Part II, I examine immigration policies that efficiently promote 
the welfare of natives, setting aside questions of distribution. I 
conclude that optimal policies would probably entail higher levels of 
employment-based and family-based immigration than we currently 
allow into the United States .  For example, the U .S .  should el iminate 
both the quantitative restrictions and the "labor certification" 
requirements currently  imposed on employment-based immigration. 
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Optimal immigration policy would instead take the form of  a 
"tariff," that is ,  a tax imposed on immigrants .  This tariff could take 
the form of an income tax that discriminates between citizens and 
aliens. Although some economists have previously suggested a tax on 
foreign workers/2 my comprehensive analysis builds on that 
suggestion by exploring the features of the optimal immigration tariff 
in  detai l .  I find that the optimal tariff is  positive for immigrants with 
low incomes but is  l ikely to be negative for immigrants with 
sufficiently high incomes . These results suggest that ski l l ed 
immigration should be permitted (indeed encouraged) without 
quantitative or other protectionist restrictions and that unskil led 
immigration should be permitted without quantitative restrictions but 
subject to less generous fiscal policies than those applied to natives. 
In  Part III, I introduce distributive j ustice among natives as an 
obj ective . Concern for the distribution of income among natives, 
however, does not imply that more restrictive immigration laws are in 
order. Instead, the appropriate response to distributive concerns is 
redistribution through progressive reforms of tax and transfer policies,  
not immigration restnctwns. Finally, in  Part IV, I explore the 
normative implications of my economic analysis and formulate 
proposals for l iberal izing U .S .  immigration laws in l ight of some of 
the political real ities that inhibit such reforms.  
II. NATIONAL ECONOMIC WELFARE 
I begin my analysis of the optimal immigration policy from the 
standpoint of national economic welfare defined narrowly,  in terms of 
the wealth of natives alone. First, I wi l l  consider the effects of 
22 See, e.g.. Jagdish N .  Bhagwati & T.N. Sr in ivasan, On the Choice Between Capital and 
Labour Mobility, 14 J .  INT'L ECON. 209, 2 18- 19 ( 1983); Barry R.  Chiswick. The Impact of 
Immigration on the Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being, in THE GATEWAY:\ U . S .  
IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND POLICIES 2 89, 308-09 ( Barry R .  Chi swick ed . ,  1982); Melvyn B .  
Krauss & W i l l iam J .  Baumol,  Guest Workers and Income-Transfer Programs Financed by 
Host Governments, 3 2  K YKLOS 36, 44 ( 1979); Alan 0. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of 
Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey with an Analysis of U.S. Policy, in JUSTICE IN 
IMMIGRATION 158, 180-82 ( Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995). 
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immigration upon natives through labor markets, setting aside 
economic effects that operate outside the market. Second, I wil l  
extend the analysis to include the effects of immigration upon natives 
through the public sector .  
A .  Ef ects of Immigration Through the Labor Market 
For a country with no market power in international markets, such 
that it cannot affect world prices, standard trade theory prescribes free 
trade to maximize national economic welfare. Import quotas or tariffs 
restrict trade and thereby sacrifice gains from trade. Protectionism 
imposes costs by driving up the price paid by domestic consumers for 
the goods in question. As a result consumption fal ls,  leading to 
deadweight loss insofar as consumers forego consumption even if  the 
value they would derive from it exceeds the amount paid to foreigners 
for the imported good. Domestic production also ri ses, leading to 
deadweight loss insofar as productive resources are drawn from 
alternative uses more valuable than the amount paid to foreigners for 
the imported good . Domestic producers may gain from higher prices 
for their goods, but this gain comes only at the expense of consumers, 
who must pay these higher prices. The gain to domestic producers is a 
pure transfer from consumers. Indeed, because protectionism causes 
distortions in domestic production and consumption, consumers lose 
more than domestic producers gain. The national economy as a whole 
suffers a net loss as a result of protectionism. 
The same theory indicates that free immigration would maximize 
the gains from trade in the labor market for a country with no market 
power in foreign labor markets .  Immigration restrictions impose costs 
by driving up the cost of labor, which in tum drives up the cost of 
goods and services to consumers. Native workers may gain from 
higher wages, but this gain comes only at the expense of employers in 
the host country and ultimately consumers. The increase in  wages for 
domestic labor is  a pure transfer from owners of other factors of 
production (for example, capital and land) in the host country and 
from consumers. Immigration restrictions not only redistribute wealth 
among natives but also destroy wealth by causing economic 
distortions. Restrictions prevent employers from hiring foreign 
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workers even i f  the value that they would produce exceeds the wage 
that would be paid to the worker. Immigration restrictions entail a 
sacrifice of thi s  "immigration surplus .  "23 Thus, the U . S .  private sector 
would benefit from the elimination of all restrictions on the 
immigration of labor. 
If a country nevertheless chooses to protect a domestic market, 
standard trade theory recommends tariffs over quotas. Both tariffs and 
quotas sacrifice gains from trade, but tariffs produce some revenue for 
the government, which quotas do not. Quotas make the right to import 
scarce and therefore valuable. This value derives from prices in the 
importing country that are higher than those available on the world 
market. The scarcity of quota rights create "quota rents," which an 
importing country could capture by selling the right to import . In  
practice, countries do not sell these rights, allowing importers to enjoy 
these quota rents . A tariff that restricts trade to a level equivalent to a 
quota will capture these quota rents in  the form of tariff revenue. 
S imilarly, if a country restricts immigration of labor, the optimal 
restriction would take the form of a tariff, not quotas. Quotas allow 
immigrants to keep the quota rents in the form of after-tax wages 
higher than those that prevail in alternative labor markets .  A tariff 
could take the form of a charge for admission, which would be similar 
to quantitative restrictions with an auction to allocate the available 
visas to those potential immigrants .  By selling visas, the country of 
immigration can capture the quota rents that would otherwise go to the 
immigrant. A tariff, however, could also take the form of a 
discriminatory income tax, rather than a payment up front, which 
would have the advantage that the immigrant would not need to have 
23 George J .  Bo�jas. The Economic Benefits from !mmlgratlon. J. ECON. PERSP . . Spring 
1995, at 3 ,  5 [hereinafter Borjas, Economic Benefltsfrom Immigration]. Borjas estimates that 
immigrat ion i nto the Uni ted States has produced a surplus of $7 b ill ion per year. See /d. at 7. 
The National Research Counc i l  surveys similar est imates, '·on the order of $ 1  to $ 1 0  b i llion a 
year ..
. 
which "may be modest re lat ive to the size of the U . S. economy, but . . .  remains a 
sign i ficant posit ive gain in absolute terms · ·  N RC, supra note 19. at 153 .  H i gher levels of 
immigrat ion would br ing a more than proportionate i ncrease in  the immigration surplus 
because the marginal benefits of immigration increase wi th the quantity of immigrat ion:  more 
of the decl ine in domestic wages comes at the expense of immigrant workers rather than 
nat ives. Therefore, we would expect a more l iberal policy to produce much larger total 
economic benefits for natives. 
.., 
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the resources to pay the tariff at the border. 24 The immigrant could pay 
the tariff as extra income taxes withheld from income earned after 
immigration.25 
For a country with some market power, protectionist trade policies 
wi l l  have an effect on prices on the world market. In  this case, 
standard trade theory predicts that the country can improve on free 
trade by imposing the "optimal tariff. "26 The optimal tariff would still 
entail costly distortions, but it would also bring a gain to the importing 
country by driving down the price received by foreigners for the 
imported goods. The importing country can thus extract more of the 
gains from trade through tariff revenues. 
The same principles apply to imported labor. To the extent the 
U .S .  can affect wages abroad, it has market power in the market for 
foreign labor, and it can gain by imposing a "tariff' on immigrant 
labor (that is ,  a discriminatory tax imposed only upon foreign 
workers). Under these conditions, the burden of a tariff would fal l  not 
only on employers and consumers but also on immigrant labor, 
because the tariff would drive the after-tax wages of migrants below 
2 4  See Ch iswick. supra note 22. at 309 (proposing that the U.S.  allow immigrants ""to 
substitute an annual surcharge on the ir  federal income tax as an alternative to [a] large entry 
fee"'): Julian L. S imon .  Auction the Right to Be an Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28 ,  1 986. at 
A25 (suggesting that the Un ited States ""allow 'buyers' to enter now and pay later together 
with i n come tax""). 
25 Some commentators have suggested that efforts to impose discriminatory taxes on 
immigrants cou ld encounter constitutional obj ections. See, e.g., Bhagwati & Srinivasan. 
supra note 22. at 2 1 1  (" [T]he (d iscriminatory) taxation by the country of residence of fore ign 
labour is fraught with numerous d ifficult ies from legal, constitutional, human-rights and 
political standpoints.");  Chiswick, supra note 22,  at 309 n .34  (predicting that an ""annual 
i ncome tax surcharge"" would raise the obj ection ""that it is unconstitutional") .  T h e  U .S .  
Supreme Court, however, has applied a lenient standard of  review to  federal laws that 
d iscriminate against aliens. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA. CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW § 1 4 . 1 2. at 704 (4th ed. 1 99 1 )  ( noting that "it would appear that the federal government 
may use a c i t izenship classification so long as it is arguably related to a federal interest"" and 
that ""alienage c lassifications created by federal law will be subj ected to only the rational basis 
standard of review""). I n  Ala thews v .  Dia::, 426 U .S .  67 (I 976), the Court held that Congress 
could provide federal medical insurance to c i tizens while restrict ing the access of aliens to th is  
program. This deferential standard of review for federal laws discriminating against aliens in 
the d istribution of welfare benefits suggests that the Court would uphold similar restrictions 
on alien access to tax benefits, such as the earned income tax credit. See infra note 3 9. 
26 See RICHARD E .  CAVES & RONALD W. JONES, WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS: AN 
INTRODUCTION 2!2- 1 3  (4th ed. 1985 ) .  
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what they would be in a world of free trade in labor. To maximize 
national economic welfare, a country with some market power in the 
relevant market would raise taxes on migrants so as to shift income 
from immigrant workers to the public treasury. For a sufficiently 
small tariff, the gains from raising tax revenues at the expense of 
migrant workers would exceed the costs of deterring valuable 
immigration. The government would capture these gains for the 
benefit of natives in the form of tariff revenue. The optimal tariff 
would vary depending on the type of labor, because different c lasses 
of labor would entail different market conditions. Thus, a 
discriminatory income tax would have an advantage over a uniform 
charge for admission, insofar as it could impose a tar iff that is a 
function of income. 
B .  External Effects of Immigration 
The foregoing analysi s  considered the economrc effects of 
immigrant labor through the labor market alone . Immigrants, 
however, also have economic effects that are not internalized by 
private participants in that market. An immigration tariff, for 
example, yields benefits for the public sector, not for the private 
sector. Indeed, much of the debate over the economic effects of 
immigration has focused on the effects on the publ ic sector.27 The 
presence of the public sector introduces external effects that must be 
included in the analysis .  
These effects include both benefits and costs, so that depending on 
the immigrant, it i s  possible for the net external effect to be positive or 
negative. First, like natives, immigrants pay taxes, including income 
taxes, social security taxes, sales taxes, and property taxes. All these 
taxes introduce an additional reason to value immigrants : they increase 
tax revenues by expanding the tax base . Second, an immigrant also 
imposes external costs. For example, to the extent that an immigrant 
receives transfer payments from the government or has access to other 
public entitlement programs, these transfers will represent a cost to the 
27 See, e.g, N RC, supra note 19, at 254-362. 
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country of immigration. Immigrants also gain access to public goods 
when they immigrate . To the extent they are pure public goods, l ike 
national defense, immigrants can enjoy the public good without 
imposing any cost on natives. Immigrant access to other public goods, 
however, may aggravate problems of congestion. Roads, for example, 
may become congested more frequently or more severely.  
Some immigrants may impose external costs in excess of the taxes 
they pay. Those immigrants who pay the least in such taxes would be 
the most l ikely to impose net external costs on natives. Thus, the net 
effect of an immigrant on the public sector may be positive or 
negative, so that the marginal benefit to a private employer of hiring a 
foreign worker may understate or overstate the marginal benefit to the 
"importing" country from the immigration of that worker. 
Thus, because skil led workers tend to have higher incomes and to 
pay more in taxes, it is  especially in the national economic interest to 
promote their immigration. The National Research Counci l ,  for 
example, found that the average immigrant with more than a high­
school education pays enough in taxes to produce a net fiscal benefit.28 
As long as they make a positive contribution to the public sector, there 
is in general no economic justification for excluding these immigrants. 
Quantitative or other protectionist restrictions on their immigration 
should be el iminated. 
To the extent that unskil led workers tend to have lower incomes, 
they tend to pay less in taxes and to take greater advantage of public 
entitlement programs, so that the benefits flowing to the national 
economy from their immigration may be reduced and may be 
negative . The Council found that the average immigrant with less 
than a high-school education imposes a net fiscal cost. 2 9  A net negative 
effect through the public sector introduces a possible justification for 
restricting their immigration. The international trade perspective, 
however, suggests that if some immigrants have a negative effect on 
the public sector, the optimal response is  not non-tariff restrictions on 
immigration, such as quotas. Rather, the appropriate response i s  
fiscal . In  such cases, we can use a tariff, that i s ,  a tax imposed only on  
cs See id at 3 34 (Table 7 .5 ) .  
c 9  See id. 
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immigrants, to restrict access to all our public goods and public 
entitlements. 
C. The Optimal Tariffon Unskilled Immigrants 
Suppose unskil led immigrants would have a negative effect on the 
public sector in the absence of a tariff, and consider the optimal tariff 
for natives to levy on them. A tariff would increase the contribution 
of these immigrants to the public coffers as wel l  as discourage their 
immigration. We could, for example, impose a tariff high enough to 
ensure the marginal immigrant ' s  net effect on the public sector is zero. 
This "Pigouvian" tariff can reduce immigration to a level that equates 
the marginal benefits to natives with the marginal costs imposed on 
natives by immigration, inc luding congestion costs. 3 0  Because the 
tariff would ensure that the marginal immigrant would impose no net 
external cost, this tariff would eliminate any immigration expected to 
have a negative effect on national economic welfare. The resulting 
Pigouvian level of immigration would be first-best from the 
perspective of maximizing the welfare of natives . 
Although this level of immigration would be efficient in this sense, 
it wil l  nevertheless be in the interest of natives to raise the tariff sti l l  
h igher. A tariff above Pigouvian levels will reduce immigration below 
optimal levels, but wil l  in general produce gains sufficient to j ustify 
this distortion. Governments need revenues to finance the provision of 
publ ic  goods, but most taxes they use to raise revenues wil l  cause 
costly distortions in the economy. These distortions imply an "excess 
burden" of taxation: taxes impose costs on the private sector that 
exceed the revenue col lected by the government.31 An optimal tax 
system will seek to minimize the excess burden associated with raising 
3 0  A '·Pigouv ian·· tax causes each person to internalize the negative externality imposed on 
others. RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER. THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, 
AND CLUB GOODS 52 ( 1 986 ) ; see DAVID A. STARRETT, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 
5 1  ( 1 988). The term "Pigouvian·· refers to the economist A. C. Pigou. who suggested such 
corrective taxes as a solution to the problem of negative external i t ies. See A.C. P IGOU, THE 
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 1 92 (4th ed. 1 932) .  
31 See DAVID N.  HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THEORY TO 
POLICY 384  (4th ed. 1993 ). 
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any given amount of tax revenue. Because tariff revenue raised from 
immigrants would allow distortionary taxes elsewhere in the economy 
to be reduced, optimal-tax considerations would call for a tariff even if  
i t  causes some distortion in  the level of immigration. An optimal tariff 
would be higher than that which induces the optimal quantity of 
immigration. Thus, the optimal tariff would assure that each 
immigrant makes on balance a net positive contribution to the public 
sector. 
Thus, for immigrants who would otherwise have a negative 
economic effect on the public sector, the optimal tariff is 
unambiguously positive . The larger the (nondiscriminatory) taxes 
paid by an immigrant, however, the more valuable the immigrant wi l l  
be for public coffers, and the less incl ined we should be to levy a 
positive tariff in addition to these other taxes. Indeed, for skilled 
immigrants who would on balance have a sufficiently positive 
economic effect on the public sector, the optimal tariff could well be 
zero or even negative. 
D. The Optimal Tariff on Skilled Immigrants 
Consider skilled immigrants who have a net positive effect on the 
public sector even in the absence of a tariff To analyze how the 
external net benefits associated with these immigrants affect the 
calculation of the optimal tariff, suppose first that the country of 
immigration has no market power: the supply of immigrants is 
perfectly elastic . In this case, there is no "market power" basis for a 
positive optimal tariff, because the incidence of taxes fal ls  only upon 
employers, who must pay higher wages as a result of taxes, not upon 
the immigrants. 
Given these assumptions, it is likely to be in the national economic 
interest to discriminate in favor of ski lled immigrants in our income 
tax rates .  The fact that these immigrants make net positive 
contributions to the public sector implies that their  tax payments are 
above Pigouvian levels and thus high enough to distort their 
immigration below first-best levels and produce deadweight loss. 
Lower taxes would expand immigration toward the first-best level, 
which would bring a gain for the economy as a whole. 
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A complete analysis, however, would also consider the need to 
raise tax revenues. Taking these effects into account still points 
toward lower tax rates on immigrant labor if  the supply of this labor is 
perfectly elastic .  Optimal-tax theory prescribes lower tax rates on 
markets where supply or demand is more elastic, so as to minimize the 
excess burden of taxation.32 Thus, suppose that skilled immigrants pay 
enough in taxes other than income taxes (such as sales taxes and 
property taxes) to cover any external costs they impose on natives. 
Optimal-tax theory would prescribe higher income taxes on natives 
than on immigrants as long as the supply of their labor is less elastic 
than the perfectly elastic supply of immigrant labor. Lower taxes on 
immigrants would increase immigration, which would generate new 
tax revenues as well as reduce the cost of labor for employers. Under 
these circumstances, the optimal tariff is unambiguously negative. 
Suppose instead, however, that the supply of immigrant labor i s  
less than perfectly elastic .  If  the supply of immigrant labor i s  upward­
sloping, then the optimal tariff is no longer unambiguously negative. 
I nelasticity of immigrant labor supply introduces two considerations 
that would cut in favor of higher tariffs. 
First, "market power" considerations mil itate in favor of a positive 
tariff on immigrants. These considerations would tend to be weak, 
however, when nondiscriminatory taxes are already high. To the 
extent we have market power, income and wage taxes not only 
discourage immigration but also drive the after-tax wages of 
immigrants downward. Both these effects undercut the case for a 
positive tariff. The more immigrants pay in these other taxes, the 
greater the marginal costs of a tariff (we lose more tax revenues when 
immigration falls) and the smaller the marginal benefits (there are 
fewer immigrants whose after-tax wages will fall) . 
Second, the more inelastic the supply of immigrant labor, the less 
optimal-tax considerations militate in favor of negative tariffs. These 
considerations would still militate in favor of lower taxes on 
immigrants than on natives, however, as long as the supply of 
immigrant labor is  more elastic than the supply of domestic labor. We 
32 See id. at 386-87; ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E.  STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS 368-69 ( 1 980) 
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would expect this condition to hold over the relevant range of wages :  
the supply of domestic labor is  elastic largely because native workers 
have the option of leaving the labor force, whereas immigrants have 
not only the option of leaving the labor force but also the option of 
remaining in their native countries and accepting employment there. 
Natives of a country of immigration are less likely than immigrants to 
respond to taxes by leaving (or fai l ing to enter) the domestic labor 
market, because each worker is inclined, ceteris paribus, to remain in 
the worker's native country. Immigrants by definition have self­
selected as workers wil l ing to move, given the international 
differences in wage levels, but the costs of moving, both psychic and 
financial, imply that many would also decide not to move if  taxes 
reduce the rewards to migration. Thus, the decision of each individual 
immigrant to supply labor to the country of immigration is l ikely to be 
more sensitive to taxes than the decision of natives to supply labor to 
the domestic labor market. 
Furthermore, we would expect the elasticity of the supply of 
immigrant labor to be particularly large if  the supply of immigrant 
labor is drawn from a world labor market that is large relative to the 
domestic labor market. Given the size of the world labor market, we 
would in general expect the supply of immigrant labor to be quite 
elastic. Thus, optimal-tax considerations not only militate in favor of 
a negative tariff, but these considerations may also be significant. 
Furthermore, the elastic ity of immigrant labor supply also suggests 
that "market power" considerations in favor of positive tariffs may be 
weak. 
Thus, the optimal tariff may be positive, but without precise 
information on elasticities and other data, the optimal tariff may also 
be negative . It is  especial ly l ikely to be negative for c lasses of 
immigrants who already bear a high tax burden, because they are 
attractive from a fiscal perspective. For skilled immigrants expected 
to pay a large amount in income and other taxes, it is l ikely to be in the 
national interest to offer lower tax rates than those imposed on natives, 
in order to encourage the immigration of more taxpayers . 
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E .  Immigration o fNuclear Families and Future Effects 
For simplic ity of analysis  the foregoing discussion has treated 
immigrants as simply individual workers. In real ity ,  workers may 
often be reluctant to migrate without bringing close family members 
with them. What would be the optimal immigration policy regarding 
the admission of an immigrant worker' s  family? As long as the 
psychic and economic benefits of family unification (measured by the 
immigrants' wi l l ingness to pay for these benefits) exceed the 
congestion costs the additional immigrants would impose on natives, i t  
wil l  be optimal to al low workers to bring their relatives. These 
benefits are l ikely to be sufficiently large for a worker' s  immediate 
family (spouses and dependent minor children),  who derive large 
benefits from cohabitation. Given the large benefits of keeping 
nuclear fami l ies united, the total benefits to the immigrant fami ly 
would probably exceed any net external costs that these relatives 
would impose on natives, even after accounting for congestion costs . 
With appropriate fiscal policies, natives can gain from the 
admission of these relatives. F irst, the immigrant household wi l l  pay 
more in sales and other taxes. Second, if these extra taxes are 
insufficient to create a net positive external effect of these additional 
immigrants, the immigrant family would  be wil l ing pay a higher tariff 
to compensate natives for any increase in external costs, such as 
congestion costs and any net transfers . By charging a higher tariff on 
larger immigrant famil ies, natives can capture some of the surplus 
produced by family unification. The optimal tariff on an immigrant 
household would depend on the economic effects of the household as 
a whole and thus would be a function of the household' s total income 
and size as wel l  as the number of dependent minor children .  
The effect of an additional family member on this optimal tariff 
raises an empirical question regarding the economic effect of that 
additional immigrant. In calculating this effect, we must take into 
account the effects that each immigrant wil l  have over the entire l ife 
cycle, including the effects that each immigrant' s  descendants wil l  
have. The chil dren and other descendants of the immigrant workers 
we admit wil l  produce the same type of gains from trade in the labor 
market that the immigrants themselves wil l  bring. These positive 
I 
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effects upon the private sector offer no reason to adjust the optimal 
tariff upward. The only possible negative effect would come through 
the public sector. Is there any reason to think that immigration will 
produce negative external costs? 
To derive the optimal immigration policy, we would add up all 
future costs and benefits associated with each immigrant worker, 
including all the fiscal costs and benefits associated with that 
immigrant ' s  descendants, discounting each cost and benefit to a net 
present value. With respect to each class of immigrant, we would 
estimate the expected total net present value on a per capita basis, 
which would be an average calculated in the face of uncertainty. We 
would count this expected value as one component of an immigrant's 
external effects . The only implication for the optimal immigration 
policy, then, would be an adjustment in the optimal tariff 
There is  no reason to presume that these effects would call for a 
higher tariff If these future effects produce a positive value for 
immigration, then a lower tariff would be optimal. Given the 
correlation between an immigrant's income and the income of the 
immigrant's descendants, we might expect skilled immigration to have 
a positive net effect through future generations.33 Furthermore, one 
would expect the descendants of even unskilled immigrants to 
assimilate and to obtain language and other skills that enable them to 
fare better than their parents in terms of economic performance. The 
available empirical evidence suggests that the children of immigrants 
do tend to outperform their  parents on average .34 
In fact, the National Research Council has found that the 
descendants of current immigrants into the United States, whether 
these immigrants are highly educated or not, are likely to have a net 
positive fiscal effect overall: although the descendants of more 
educated immigrants tend to have larger positive effects, even the 
descendants of immigrants with less than a high-school education will 
3 3  See George J .  Borjas, The Economics of immigration, 32 J .  ECON. LIT. 1 667, 1 7 1 1 - 1 2  
( 1 994) [hereinafter Borj as. Economics of Imm igration] (d iscussing evidence that immigrant 
ski l l  d i fferentials persist over generations). 
34 See id. at 1 7 1 1 .  
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on average have a significant positive effect. 35  The Council estimates 
that once we take the positive fiscal effect of the immigrant' s  
descendants into account, the average immigrant with less than a high­
school education, for example, imposes only a modest net fiscal cost 
of $ 1 3 ,000 in net present value in  1 996 dollars . 36 The corresponding 
fiscal impacts of more educated immigrants are positive : the average 
immigrant with a high-school education produces a net surplus of 
$5 1 ,000, and the average immigrant with more than a high-school 
education produces a net surplus of $ 1 98,000.3 7  Furthermore, the 
Council ' s  analysis also reveals that immigrants who arrive at age 2 1  or 
younger, whether highly educated or not, have a positive net fiscal 
effect.38 This finding suggests that if  an immigrant worker brings a 
dependent child as an immigrant into the United States, this child 
would represent a reason to reduce taxes on the immigrant worker, 
even from the perspective of the welfare of natives alone. Indeed, the 
Council ' s  findings suggest that if an immigrant bears children after 
immigration, this fact would increase the economic benefits associated 
with that immigrant household and would represent a reason to adjust 
taxes on the household downward rather than upward. 
F. Restrictions on Public Benefits as a Positive Tariff 
A country of immigration may implement a positive tariff on 
immigration not only through a tax on immigrants but also through 
restrictions on immigrant access to public entitlement programs .  Either 
form of tariff could improve the effect of immigration on the 
economic welfare of natives. Natives may gain, for example, by 
denying immigrants access to transfers, such as the earned income tax 
3 5  See NRC. supra note 1 9. at 328 (F igure 7 . 1 0, Panel C) .  This resu lt emerges because the 
descendants of rel at ively uneducated immigrants show substantial  upward educationa l  
mob i l ity. See id. at  3 56-57.  The positive fiscal impact of an immigrant ' s  descendants range 
from $76,000 for an immigrant with l ess than a h igh-school education to $93,000 for an 
immigrant with more than a high-school education. See id. at 334 (Tab l e  7 . 5 )  ( reporting net 
present value of average fiscal impacts in 1 996 dol lars). 
36 See id. at 334  (Table 7 .5 ) .  
37  See id. 
38 See id. at 328  (Figure 7 . 1 0, Panel A). 
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credit in the United States, which provides cash payments to low­
income workers.39 A positive tariff on immigrant labor can take the 
form of an income tax credit provided to al l citizens but denied to 
al iens, combined with an otherwise nondiscriminatory mcome tax 
system.  
The objective of reducing the burden immigrants impose on 
natives through the public sector underl ies restrictions on the access of 
aliens to various entitlement programs. Under U .S .  law, for example, 
even before Congress enacted new restrictions in 1 996,40 aliens were 
generally ineligible for most public entitlements, including Medicaid, 
Aid to Famil ies with Dependent Children (AFDC), and food stamps, 
unless they had been lawfully admitted for permanent residence.41 
Thus, not only unauthorized immigrants but also aliens admitted to the 
United States temporari ly as nonimmigrants, including temporary 
workers, were ineligible for most public benefits because they were 
not lawfully admitted for permanent residence .42 Current law now 
generally excludes nonimmigrants and unauthorized immigrants from 
an even broader range of public benefits : with only narrow exceptions, 
these aliens are ineligible for "any Federal public benefit."43 
39 For an examination of the earned income tax cred it, sec Danie l  Shaviro, The Aiinimum 
Wage, the Earned Income TCL-r: Credit, and Optima! Subsid_v Po!icy, 64 U. CHI .  L. REV. 405 
( 1 997):  Anne L. Alstott, The Earned income Ten Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based 
Welfare Reform, 1 08 HARV.  L. REv. 533 ( 1 995) .  
40 See Personal Responsib i l ity and Work Opportun ity Reconci l i at ion Act of 1 996, Pub.  L.  
No. 1 04- 1 93 .  1 1 0 Stat. 2 1 05 .  
4 1  See 4 2  U.S .C.  § 1 396b(v) ( 1 994) (l imiting t h e  e l ig ib i l ity o f  al iens for M ed icaid benefits); 
id. § 602(a)(33 )  ( l imiting the e l igi b i l ity of al iens for AFDC benefits); id. § ! 43 6a (l imiting the 
e l ig ib i l ity of al iens for publ ic housing assistance) ;  7 U .S .C .  § 20 1 5(f) ( 1 994) (l imiting the 
e l igib i l ity of al iens for food stamps) .  
42 Al iens other than permanent residents, however. may be el igible for the earned income 
tax credit if they are resident al iens for tax purposes. See 26 U . S.C.  § 32(c)( l )(E) ( 1 994) 
(excluding nonresident al iens from the earned i ncome ta-.: credit) .  A lawfu l permanent 
resident is a resident al ien for these purposes, but other al iens may also be resident  al iens if 
they meet certain conditions. See id. § 770 I (b)( I )(A).  For example, if an a l ien ' s  presence i n  
t h e  Un ited States sat isfies t h e  "substantial  presence'" test set forth i n  t h e  statute, see id. § 
770 l (b)(3 ), then the a l ien is treated as a resident. 
43 8 U .S .  C. § 1 6 1 1 (a) (Supp. II 1 996). Furthermore, the new law also proh ibits states from 
providing ·'any State or local pub l ic benefit" to unauthorized immigrants un less the state 
subsequently enacts a law that "affirmatively provides for such e l ig ib i l ity '' !d. § 1 62 1  (Supp. 
II 1 996) .  The new law also makes expl icit the exclusion of aliens from the earned income tax 
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Current law also includes extensive new restrictions on the access 
of other aliens, including even legal permanent residents, to federal 
entitlement programs. In particular, an alien admitted for permanent 
residence after enactment of the new law is ineligible for "any Federal 
means-tested public benefit for a period of 5 years beginning on the 
date of the alien ' s  entry into the United States," with only narrow 
exceptions.�� Furthermore, these permanent resident aliens are now 
inel igible for food stamps and for Supplemental Security Income (SSI)  
without regard to length of residence in the United States,  with only 
narrow exceptions.45 Final ly, the new law also permits states to 
exclude permanent resident aliens, including current recipients already 
admitted to the United States, from benefits under other federal 
programs, including Medicaid and Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Famil ies (TANF), and under state programs, without regard to length 
of residence in the United States.46 The National Research Council  
estimates that by excluding immigrants from means-tested benefits for 
their first five years in the United States, this welfare legislation 
improves the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant by $8 ,000 in  
net present value in 1 996 dol lars.47 This figure represents an  estimate 
of the average value of the positive tariff imposed by the 1 996  welfare 
legislation. 
G.  Unemployment 
Unemployment poses two types of problems for immigration 
policy. The first arises from the unemployment of immigrants. The 
second arises from the unemployment of natives .  
credit  i f  they are not authorized t o  work i n  the U n ited States. See 26 U . S .  C .  9 3 2  ( Supp. I I  
1 996) .  Thus. unauthorized immigrants are inel igible for the earned income tax cred i t .  
4 4  8 U.S .C .  § 1 6 1 3 (a) (Supp. I I  I 996) .  
45 /d. § I 6 I 2(a) .  One except ion appl ies to legal permanent residents who have "worked for 
40 qual ifying quarters . .. /d. 9 I 6 I 2(a)(2 )(B) .  Thus, under th is  l aw, a permanent resident al ien 
must work for a sufficient period of t ime to earn an entit lement to these benefits. 
46 See id. § 1 6 1 2(b) (al lowing states to restrict alien access to designated federal programs); 
id. § 1 622 (al lowing states to restrict al ien access to state publ ic  benefits). Each provi sion 
features exceptions that inc l ude legal permanent residents who have ··worked for 40 
qual i fying quarters.·· !d. § §  1 6 1 2(b)(2)(B}, 1 622(b)(2) .  
47 See NRC, supra note 1 9, at  339.  
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First, indigent immigrants who are (or l ikely to become) 
unemployed may be unlikely to pay enough taxes to cover the costs of 
public entitlements that they would receive and the congestions costs 
that they would generate. For this reason, it may be prudent for the 
United States generally to reserve most employment-based 
immigration visas for those who have offers of employment in the 
United States (and their famil ies). In  fact, the immigration laws of the 
United States currently requires employer sponsorship for most 
categories of employment-based immigration visas.48 Furthermore, if 
immigrants who are unlikely to "pay their way" can be identified, and 
they do not have sponsors (such as relatives in  the country of 
immigration) will ing and able to support them, they can be excluded 
on that ground. The U .S .  immigration statute authorizes the exclusion 
of aliens deemed "likely at any time to become a public charge."49 
Second, unemployment among native workers introduces another 
negative externality from immigration if immigrants increase the 
involuntary unemployment of natives. The U .S .  immigration statute 
responds to thi s  concern by imposing various restrictions, including 
quantitative restrictions and "labor certification" requirements, on the 
admission of employment-based immigrants and temporary workers. 5° 
48 See 8 US.C. § 1 1 54(a)( 1 )(D)  ( 1 994) The on ly exceptions are a l i ens with 
··extraord inary abi l i ty i n  the sciences. arts. education. business. or ath let ics. ·· id § 
1 1 53 (b )( 1 ) (A) . . .  qual ified spec ial immigrants ... id § 1 1 5 3 (b)(4),  and "qual i fied immigrants 
seeking to enter the Un ited States for the purpose of engaging in a new commercial 
enterprise·· that wi l l  employ U.S. workers. id 9 1 1 53 (b)( 5 )(A) .  The relat ively smal l  number 
of imm igrants fal l ing  into these categories. inc luding especial ly ski l led or wealthy al iens. may 
ti le petit ions on their own behalf. See id § 1 1 54(a)( I ) (C),  (E) ,  (F) .  A l iens seeking v i sas as 
temporary workers under U .S .  law also require sponsoring employers. See id § 
1 1 0 l (a)( l 5 ) (H) .  
49 8 US.C. § l l 82(a)(4 )  ( Supp. I I  1 996) ("Any al ien who . . .  at the t ime of app l i cation for 
admi ssion . .  is l i ke ly at any t ime to become a publ ic  charge is i nadmissible .") .  
s o  Employment-based immigration is normal ly capped at 1 40,000 visas, 8 US.C.  § l l 5 1 (d )  
( 1 994 ) ,  but t h e  qual itat ive restri ctions are so stringent and t h e  " labor cert ification·· 
requ i rement so burdensome that th is  cei l ing has not i n  fact been binding. I n  the 1 996 fiscal 
year. for example, the Un ited States admitted only 1 1 7.346 employment-based immigrants. 
See CIR, supra note 1 7. at 3. Furthermore, no more than 65 ,000 temporary workers may enter 
on H- 1 B v isas .. to perform services . . .  in  a specialty occupation . . .  or as a fash ion mode l, " '  8 
U .S .  C. § I I  0 l (a)( l 5 )( H )( i ) (b)  ( 1 994 ), and no more than 66,000 temporary workers may enter 
on H-28 v isas, id 9 l l O I (a)( l 5 ) (H )( i i )(b) .  See id § l 1 84(g)( l ). Congress imposed these 
numerical l imi ts on temporary workers only recently. in  1 990, and these cei l i ngs represent the 
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Labor certification is a determination by the Department of Labor that 
"there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified, . . .  
and available . . .  at the place where the alien i s  to perform" the work i n  
question and that the employment o f  the alien "will not adversely 
affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United 
States similarly employed."51 The U .S .  immigration statute requires 
labor certification for most employment-based immigrants, even aliens 
"who are members of the professions holding advanced degrees or 
aliens of exceptional ability," professionals "who hold baccalaureate 
degrees," and others "performing skilled labor."52 Through the labor­
certification requirement, the U .S .  government requires U . S .  
employers to discriminate against foreign workers : the statute requires 
an employer to prefer any qualified U .S .  worker over any foreign 
worker, no matter how much better qualified the foreign worker may 
be.53 
As long as fiscal policies, employer sponsorship, and the "public 
charge" provision ensure that these immigrants and temporary workers 
are expected to have a net positive economic effect on natives, 
however, it would be in the economic interests of U .S .  natives to admit 
them without protectionist "labor certification" requirements or 
quantitative restnct10ns. Indeed, immigration need not increase 
unemployment among natives at all. Immigrants not only expand the 
local supply of labor but also expand the local demand for labor. 
Immigrant workers will demand goods and services, and many of 
these goods and services will require locally supplied labor. In fact, 
first quantitative restrictions ever imposed on any category of non immigrants. See STEPHEN 
H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 242 (2d ed. 1 997) .  
5 1  8 U.S .C.  § I I 82(a)(5 )(A) ( 1 994). 
51 !d § 1 1 53 (b)(2 )-(3 ) ;  see id § 1 1 54(b), 1 1 82(a)(5 )(0). The requ irement also appl ies to 
temporary agricu ltural workers on H-2A v isas, see id § 1 1 88(a)( I ), and other temporary 
workers on H-28 visas. see 8 C .F .R .  § 2 1 4 .2(h)(6)( iv )  ( 1 998) .  
53 See LEGOMSKY, supra note 50, at 1 85 (" [T]he emp loyer ordinari ly must h i re a min imal ly  
qual i fied American over a more qual i fied al ien (or h i re no one at a l l ) .") .  The  statute requ i res 
the U.S .  worker to be "equally qual i fied" only in the case of an al ien who "is a member of the 
teaching profession'' or "has exceptional abi l ity i n  the sciences or the arts." 8 U . S .C.  § 
1 1 82(a) (5 )(A) ( 1 994 ). 
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studies consistently demonstrate that immigration has l ittle effect on 
the employment of natives.54 
H. Citizenship, Guestworkers, and Illegal Immigration 
Up to this point, I have analyzed immigration independent of the 
issue of naturalization as a U . S .  citizen. The possibil ity of 
naturalization raises the question of whether discrimination against the 
immigrant would cease once the immigrant obtains c itizenship. If so, 
then immigrants might anticipate citizenship and subsequent access to 
public entitlements. If  the period of alienage is  too short to permit the 
collection of the Pigouvian tariff, then fiscal policies l imited to aliens 
may fai l  to deter all immigration with negative economic impact on 
natives. 
We can, however, separate admission to the United States from 
access to naturalization. Indeed, under U .S .  law, only aliens "admitted 
for permanent residence" may naturalize as U .S .  citizens.55 Aliens 
admitted on nonimmigrant visas only, including temporary workers, 
are not admitted as permanent residents and are thus not el igible for 
most public entitlements and not el igible to naturalize. 56 
Classes of foreign workers deemed l ikely to have a negative 
economic impact if treated as citizens can be admitted on 
nonimmigrant visas without the same entitlement to citizenship 
implied by immigrant visas . The host country can keep an alien 
worker in guestworker status for as long as it deems necessary to 
collect the appropriate tariff. The collection of this tariff need not 
entail permanent status as an alien: the host country could al low the 
54 Surveys of th is  emp irical l i terature reveal wide consensus on th is conclusion. See, e.g. . 
Borj as. Economics of Immigration, supra note 33,  at 1 698 (" I t  is evident that immigration has 
a weak effect on the employment of nat ives .") ;  Rachel M. Friedberg & Jenn i fer H unt, The 
Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment and Growth, J .  ECON. PERSP., 
Spring 1 995, at 23, 42 ("There i s  no  evidence of economical ly s ignificant reductions in  nati ve 
employment."). 
5 5  8 U .S .C .  § 1 427(a) ( 1 994). 
56 See supra note 43 . 
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alien to naturalize after a sufficient probationary period has passed.57 
The appropriate tariff would at least cover the present discounted 
value of any net costs that we expect the worker to impose on natives 
after the worker obtains U .S .  citizenship. 
The alternative to a guestworker program, for many migrant 
workers and for the United States, is probably entry as an 
unauthorized immigrant. A liberalized guestworker program would 
relieve the pressures in the labor market that generate unauthorized 
immigration. In fact, the United States brought in hundreds of 
thousands of agricultural guestworkers from Mexico annually for most 
years of the "bracero" program from 1 942 to 1 964, and the decline in 
admissions of such workers was closely correlated with the rise in the 
estimated number of unauthorized immigrants. 58 
Legalization of this migration would serve the interests of all 
parties concerned. The workers would gain from having a legal 
alternative to illegal entry and life as an unauthorized immigrant, 
which leaves them vulnerable to deportation by the government and to 
abuse by employers. Illegal immigration implies that the unauthorized 
immigrant must bear the costs of evading detection, apprehension, and 
deportation by the government. As a result, producers of  counterfeit 
documents, smugglers, and unscrupulous employers can extract 
significant quota rents from the immigrant. Through a positive tariff, 
the government can collect some share of the value that immigrants 
would enjoy as a result of legal status, including quota rents they 
would otherwise transfer to forgers, smugglers, and unscrupulous 
employers . Natives would derive more benefit with these rents going 
57 Nor would  a guestworker program produce a hereditary c lass of a lien  residents in the 
United States. because the Fourteenth Amendment of the U .S .  Constitution confers U .S .  
citizenship on  anyone born in the U nited States, including the children of  non immigrants. See 
U.S .  CoNST. amend. X IV ,  § I ("A l l  persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subj ect to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside.''); U nited States v. Wong Kim Ark, 1 69 U .S .  649. 676 ( 1 898) .  Thus, guestworker 
programs in the Un ited States cannot create the type of caste society that they might in 
countries that do not provide b irthright cit izenship. 
58 See J ULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF I Miv!IGRATION 302 ( 1 989) 
("Experience with the bracero program provides solid evidence that a l egal temporary worker 
program wil l  indeed reduce i l l egal immigration . . . .  ") ; see also id. at 286 ( Figure 1 5  . I ) . 
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to the public treasury instead, which would allow a reduction in other 
taxes. 
More skilled immigrants, however, will make positive 
contributions to the public sector even when treated as citizens . There 
would be little reason from an economic perspective to deny these 
immigrants access to citizenship or to delay their naturalization for a 
significant period of time. On the contrary, because their presence 
yields external benefits, it is in the interest of the country of 
immigration to promote their immigration and to strengthen their ties 
to the host country. Legal status that includes the option of U .S .  
citizenship in relatively short order would make our offer more 
attractive to prospective skilled immigrants and increase the likelihood 
that they will stay once they take up residence here. Thus, at least in 
the case of skilled immigrants, we can offer quick access to U .S .  
citizenship and simultaneously further the economic interest of  
natives.  
In fact, the categories of employment-based immigration visas 
under U .S .  law are largely designed to select particularly skilled or 
wealthy immigrants for permanent residence . 59 Quotas for 
employment-based immigration allocate most visas to "priority 
workers," which include aliens with "extraordinary ability," 
"outstanding professors and researchers," and "multinational 
executives and managers," to "members of the professions holding 
advanced degrees or aliens of exceptional ability," and to other 
"skilled workers" and "professionals."60 The vast majority of 
employment-based immigrants enter through these categories . 6 1  Few 
unskilled workers can obtain such visas :  of the 1 40,000 visas allocated 
59 As a resul t. the National Research Counc i l  finds that "(n]ew immigrants admitted under 
employment-preference visas have substant ia l ly greater earn ings than those in  other 
categories."' NRC, supra note 1 9, at 1 94. 
60 8 u . s.c.  § 1 1 53 (b)( l )-(3 )  ( 1 994). 
61 See JORDAN COMM'N, supra note I 0, at 89 (Chart 2 5 ). Smal ler numbers of vi sas are 
avai lable for unsk i l led workers, see 8 U.S .C .  § 1 1 53 (b)(3 )(A)( i i i), (B)  ( 1 994), for '·qual ified 
special immigrants," id. § 1 1 5 3(b)(4), and for foreign investors, who must invest at l east $ 1  
m i l l ion in a new commercial  enterprise that w i l l  create at least ten jobs in  the Un ited States, 
see id. § 1 1 53(b)(5 )  . 
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to employment-based immigration per year, only 1 0,000 may go to 
unskilled workers .62 
More employment-based visas are available for unskil led workers 
who enter as nonimmigrants. Unskil led workers may enter on H-2A 
visas as agricultural workers, which are not subject to a quantitative 
restriction, or on H-2B visas for workers who come "temporari ly to 
the United States to perform . . .  temporary service or l abor," which are 
l imited to 66,000 per year.63 This "double requirement of 
'temporariness"' requires the H-2B alien not only to enter temporaril y  
but also t o  fi l l  a temporary job.64 Furthermore, both visas are subj ect to 
labor certification requirements.65 As a result of these requirements, 
the demand for each of these visas have remained low, but the 
l iberalization or e limination of these requirements could greatly 
increase use of these programs. 66 
Employment-based immigration of unskil led workers into the 
United States has largely  taken the form of il legal rather than legal 
immigration, with this unauthorized immigrant population currently 
growing by as many as 300 ,000 aliens each year .67 Given that 
unauthorized immigrants have little access to public entitlements for 
as long as their presence remains unauthorized, they may make a 
positive contribution to publ ic coffers under the fiscal po licies 
currently applied to them. Without distinguishing between legal and 
i l legal immigrants, the National Research Council found that once we 
take the positive fiscal effect of the immigrant' s  descendants into 
account, an immigrant with less than a high-school education imposes 
62 See 8 US.C § §  1 1 5 1 (d )( I )(A). 1 1 53 (b)(3) (A)( i i i ). (B) ( 1 994) .  
6 3  !d. § I I O I (a)( I 5 ) ( H )( i i ) ; see id. § 1 1 84(g)( I ) (B) .  
64  THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., I MMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POL ICY 
395 (4th ed. 1 998). 
65 See 8 U . S.C § 1 1 88(a)( l )  ( 1 994); 8 CF.R .  § 2 1 4.2(h )(6)( iv)  ( 1 998) .  
66 Admissions under H-28 v isas has remained below one third of the quota l im i t  i n  recent  
years, and admissions under H-2A v isas have been si mi lar. ALEINIKOFF ET AL..  supra note 64, 
at 393, 395; see id. at 395 ("'t is cl ear, however, that the demand wou ld be much higher but 
for the double ' temporariness' requ irement. ' ' ) ;  Sykes, supra note 22, at 1 89 ( report ing that 
'· [a)dmissions under the H-2 categories have been modest in recent years, on the order o f  
3 5,000 for t h e  two combined" a n d  exp la in ing that '·because of t h e  transaction costs of 
obtain ing a v isa coupled with the l i mited cert ificat ions for labor shortages i n  the agr icu ltural 
sector. employers often find that these v isas are not worth the effort to procure' ' ) .  
67 See N RC, supra note 1 9, at  5 1 .  
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a net fiscal cost of only $ 1 3 ,000 in net present value in 1 996 dol lars,68 
and that if  the 1 996 welfare legislation excludes immigrants from 
seven specified means-tested benefits for only their  first five years in 
the United States,  then the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant 
would improve by $8 ,000 .69 The Council ' s  figures suggest that if an 
immigrant never has access to such benefits, as would be the case for 
an unauthorized immigrant who never obtains legal status ,  then such 
an immigrant would probably have a positive fiscal impact even if the 
immigrant is unskil led . 
These figures also suggest that at current levels  of immigration, the 
tariff that would be sufficient to internalize the net fiscal costs of an 
unski l led guestworker would be wel l  below the prohibitive level . 70 The 
degree of international inequality in wages, the magnitude of 
unauthorized immigration into the United States, and the fees that 
unauthorized immigrants are willing to pay to smugglers suggest that a 
large number of aliens would be will ing to enter as guestworkers even 
if this  required paying a significant fraction of thei r  income as a 
63 See id at 334 (Table 7 .5) .  
6 9  See id at  339 ( assuming that  these programs include · 'SSI ,  AFDC,  food stamps, non­
emergency Medicaid. energy assi stance, rent subsidies. and publ ic  housing"') .  
70 If the Counc i l ' s  figures represent the fi scal i mpact o f  the average unski l le d  guestworker, 
such a tariff may come to only several thousand dol lars. which even a min imu m-wage worker 
could p lausibly pay within a period of several years. A tru ly temporary worker, however, 
would remain in the Uni ted States only whi le  emp loyed and would then return home, 
imposing even less of  a burden on the publ ic treasury than a permanent resident. See Sykes. 
supra note 22. at 1 89 (""Temporary workers arc even less l ikely than permanent immigrants to 
be a net drai n on the publ ic  sector, g iven that these workers pay taxes j ust l ike  anyone e lse, 
federal funds cannot be used to provide them with pub! ic safety net benefits, and their right to 
remain in the country general ly depends on continuing employment.'') ( footnote omitted) .  
I m m i grants are l i kely to make a positive contribut ion to  the publ ic  treasury during their 
working years and impose a burden only if they remain i n  the U n ited States for their 
retirement years and gain access to publ ic  benefits. See N RC, supra note I 9, at 3 1 5  ( F igure 
7 .9 ). Thus, to avoid a negative fi scal impact, we wou ld only need to col lect a tariff from a 
guestworker who remained in the Uni ted States as a permanent resident. For example, v;e 
could col lect a tar iff from a l l  guestworkers and offer a rebate for any guestworker who 
chooses to return home, retaining only the tariff revenue necessary to cover the cost of any 
publ ic  benefits provided to the guestworker. For guestworkers who wish to remain i n  the 
Uni ted States permanently, we cou ld offer the option of adj usting their status to permanent 
residence once they had paid a suffi c ient tari ff. The Counc i l ' s  estimates suggest that a modest 
tariff may be sufficient to cover the expected net fiscal costs of  the permanent residence of an 
average unski l led immigrant. 
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tariff71 More unski l led workers would probably enter under a 
l iberalized guestworker policy without quotas than under our current 
laws, even i f  we were to impose the optimal tari f f  on these 
guestworkers and continue to exclude them from most publ ic  benefits. 
Under current employment-based immigration policies, the United 
States reserves permanent residence, and thus cit izenship, for the 
skil led and the wealthy. Those admitted as immigrants to the United 
States are e l igible to apply for citizenship after a five-year waiting 
period. 72 Given that the optimal tari f f  may wel l  call for d iscrimination 
in favor o f  skil led immigrants and against similarly ski l led natives, we 
might view an offer o f  citizenship after a short waiting period as an 
e fficient supplement or alternative to a negative tar i ff That is ,  the 
option value o f  citizenship for the skil led immigrant, whether psychic 
or economic, would probably equal or exceed any economic cost to 
natives from making thi s  o f fer. There fore, an o f fer o f  U .S .  citizenship 
for ski l led immigrants after a short waiting period would be an 
e fficient means for improving our o f fer o f  employment in the United 
States. 
I .  Family-Based Immigration as a Negative Tariff 
Similarly, immigration laws that allow ski lled immigrants to 
petition for the immigration o f  their relatives might be viewed as an 
e fficient substitute for an expl icit negative tari ff That is ,  the right to 
sponsor relatives for immigration visas on more favorable terms than 
71 Unauthorized immigrants from Mexico. for example. have recently reported that they 
receive wages in  the U nited States nearly n ine t imes what they receive  in  Mexico. See 
:'v[exican Deportees Report Good Treatment, UPL Apr. 2 1 . 1 996. available in L E X I S. Nexis 
L ibrary. UP! Fi le (reporting that Mex ican immigrants rece ived an average o f  $278 per week 
in  the Uni ted States, compared with $30.8 1 per week in  Mexico). G iven such large d isparities 
in  wages. unauthorized immigrants are w i l l i ng  to pay large sums to smugglers for entry into 
the Un ited States. See Somin i  Sengupta, Crackdowns Have Smugglers Trying New Routes, 
Officials Say, N . Y. TIMES, June I ,  1 998, at B6 ( report i ng that the pr ices that C hinese 
immigrants currently pay to be smuggled into the Un i ted States range from $40,000 to 
$45,000). 
72 The wait ing period is general ly five years. see 8 U .S .C .  § 1 427(a) ( 1 994), but an 
i mm igrant who is married to a U .S .  c i t izen may natura l ize after only three years if they have 
been ' ' l i v ing in marital union" during this period. !d. § 1 430(a) .  
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they could otherwise obtain may well stimulate skilled immigration at 
lower cost to natives than a formal negative tariff designed to be 
equally attractive. For example, for fami ly-based immigrants, we 
might dispense with the requirement of employer sponsorship appl ied 
to employment-based immigrants. In fact, U .S .  immigration laws 
require employer sponsorship only for employment-based visas : 
fami ly-based immigration does not require a petition from a 
prospective employer. The prospect of fami ly reunification may lead 
skil led al iens to come the United States who would not otherwise. 
As an additional benefit for the immigrant fami ly, we might also 
offer these fami ly-based immigrants permanent residence and access 
to citizenship, which would imply nondiscriminatory taxes and access 
to public entitlements ,  even if we might otherwise admit al iens with 
simi lar ski l l s  only on nonimmigrant visas and impose a positive tariff 
on them. Before Congress enacted new restrictions on immigrant 
access to public entit lements in 1 996, the United States generally 
provided such access to family-based immigrants even before 
naturalization : as legal permanent resident aliens, they enj oyed formal 
access to most of the public entitlements provided to citizens. While 
the new restrictions drastically curtai l immigrant access to public 
benefits, U .S .  law continues to provide permanent resident aliens 
greater access to public benefits than that enjoyed by nonimmigrant 
al iens. Furthermore, as permanent residents, family-based immigrants 
are eligible to natural ize as U .S .  c itizens, and once natural ized, enjoy 
the same fiscal policies applied to U.S .  natives. This equal treatment, 
even for less skil led immigrants, may be in the economic interest of 
natives insofar as skil led aliens contemplating immigration to the 
United States take into account the benefits thei r relatives wi l l  enjoy as 
family-based immigrants. 
In this sense, fami ly-based immigration may act as an implicit 
negative tariff. · Like an explicit negative tariff, family-based 
immigration may reduce the external benefits associated with each 
individual skil led immigrant, but as long as the family as a whole does 
not impose a net cost, family-based immigration may stimulate 
enough ski l led immigration to be in the economic interest of natives. 
Furthermore, the presence of a sponsoring relative in the United States 
improves the l ikelihood that the sponsored relatives wil l  integrate 
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smoothly into the U .S .  economy and wi l l  thus yield external benefits 
for natives rather than costs. Thus, an offer of fami ly-based 
immigration may be an efficient means to improve our employment 
offer to skilled immigrants whi le maintaining a nondiscriminatory tax 
system. 
We have already seen that it may be efficient to allow even the 
least skil led immigrant to bring a spouse and dependent children. The 
efficient policy may vary with the wealth of the immigrant, insofar as 
a wealthier immigrant may be wil l ing to pay more for the immigration 
of a given relative . In this case, the economic value of a relative ' s  
immigration may b e  more l ikely t o  exceed the external costs that the 
relative would impose on natives. G iven that skil led immigrants have 
higher levels of wealth than unskil led immigrants, their  wil lingness to 
pay for the immigration of relatives may make it efficient to admit 
more distant relatives of ski l led immigrants than of unskil led 
immigrants. If so, it may be optimal to allow skil led immigrants to 
sponsor a wider set of relatives than unskilled immigrants. In fact, 
under current U .S .  law, immigrants may petition for the immigration 
of not only their spouses and children but ultimately also their parents, 
adult sons and daughters, and siblings.73 The United States does not 
grant temporary workers "permanent resident" status, however, and so 
they may not petition for the admission of the same classes of relatives 
(either as immigrants or nonimmigrants), but they may bring spouses 
and mmor children with them into the United States as 
nonimmigrants . 74 
Although an immigrant may have access to some public benefits 
after admission to the United States (and ful l  access after 
naturalization), any alien deemed " l ikely at any time to become a 
73 Permanent resident al iens may sponsor their  spouses, ch i ldren ( under the  age o f  2 1  ) ,  
unmarried sons, and unmarried daughters for i m m igrant v isas subj ect to q uotas. See 8 U . S.C.  
§ 1 1 53 (a) (2)  ( 1 994 ) .  Once an imm igrant natural izes as  a U.S.  c i t izen. then l i ke other c i t izens, 
the i m migrant may sponsor a spouse. ch i ldren, and parents, who can obtain immigrant v i sas 
avai lable for " immediate relati ves" without quanti tat ive l im its. See id § 1 1 5 1 (b)(2)(A) ( i ) .  A l l  
U . S. c it izens may also sponsor their ' ·unmarried sons o r  daughters,'' id § I I  5 3 (  a ) (  I ), "married 
sons or married daughters,'' id § 1 1 5 3 (a)(3) ,  and '·brothers or si sters," id § 1 1 5 3 ( a)(4),  for 
i m m i grant v isas, with each category subj ect to quotas. 
74 See id § I I O I (a)( I 5 ) (H) .  
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public charge" may be excluded.75 In  making thi s  determination, 
consular officers consider the al ien ' s  age, health, education, ski l ls ,  and 
assets. 76 Based on such evidence, consular officers have broad powers 
to screen out immigrants expected to have a negative effect on the 
public treasury. This inadmissibil ity ground serves to ensure that 
family-based immigration as wel l  as employment-based immigration 
is  l ikely to have a net positive effect on the economic welfare of 
natives. 
In fact, in the most careful  and complete empirical analysis of the 
fiscal impact of immigration to date, the National Research Counci l  
found that even before Congress enacted new restrictions on 
immigrant access to publ ic benefits in 1 996, immigrants would have a 
net positive effect on the public treasury: that is ,  they and their 
descendants are l ikely to pay more in taxes than they wil l  consume in 
public benefits .  The Counci l  estimates that the average immigrant wil l 
produce a net fiscal benefit of $80,000 overall in net present value in 
1 996 dollars.77 This surplus is  striking because the Council ' s  
calculation includes all immigrants, including refugees and 
unauthorized immigrants,78 who are not subj ect to the "public charge" 
inadmissibil ity ground and have thus tended to be less educated and 
poorer than employment-based and fami ly-based immigrants . 79 
75 !d. § 1 1 82(a)( 4 ) ; see LEGOMSKY. supra note 50. at 3 1 6  c-·over the years, the pub l ic  
charge prov ision h as become the s ingle most common affi rmative substantive basis for denials 
of  imm igrant visas and one of the most common for non imm igrants . . . .  ·· ( footnotes omitted)) .  
7 6  See 8 U . S.C.  § l \ 82(a)(4)( B ) ( i )  ( Supp. I I  1 996). 
7 7  See N RC, supra note 1 9. at 3 3 4  (Table 7 .5 ) .  
7 8  See id. at  306 ( '" I n  principle,  these surveys cover i l legal i m m igrants as  wel l  as legal 
immigrants . . . .  In our analysis we cannot d istinguish between l egal and i l legal i m migrants.") .  
7 9  See id. at \ 94 ( noting that among l egal immigrants, '·re fugees or asylees and their 
spouses have the lowest occupational earn i ngs");  MICHAEL FIX & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, 
IMMIGRATION AND I MMIGRANTS: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 5,  3 1 , 3 4. 3 7 ( 1 994) 
( presenting evidence that unauthorized immigrants and refugees tend to h ave less education 
and lower i ncomes than other immigrants). Those seeking ad mission as refugees are not 
subj ect to the "publ i c  charge" inadmiss ib i l ity ground. See 8 U.S .C .  § \ 1 5 7(c ) (3 )  ( 1 994).  
Furthermore. as M ichael Fix and Jeffrey Passel note:  "The only major i m m igrant population 
e l igible to partic ipate broadly i n  the nation ' s  wel fare state from date of entry is  refugees.· ·  Frx 
& PASSEL, supra, at 63. Their data indicate that refugees receive welfare at far h i gher rates 
than other immigrants. See id. at 63 ,  65 (Figure 2 1  ) ; see also id. at 58 ("When refugees are 
excluded. it becomes c l ear that immigrants of working age are considerably less l i ke ly  than 
natives of working age to receive we lfare.").  
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Furthermore, the Counci l  estimates that the 1 996 welfare legislation 
would improve the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant by 
$8,000 by excluding immigrants from various means-tested benefits.80 
Thus, if  the new welfare law has the effects predicted by its 
proponents, then the positive net fiscal impact of immigration wil l  
increase: the new restrictions would not only reduce the transfers paid 
to individual immigrants but also discourage the immigration of low­
income aliens. 
To avoid the "public charge" inadmissibility ground, sponsoring 
relatives have often provided affidavits of support and evidence of 
their own incomes in order to gain the admission of the sponsored 
alien . 8 1  Thus, when the sponsored alien has had a low income, then the 
income of the sponsor would become relevant : this inadmissibil ity 
ground has in effect l imited the right to sponsor low-income relatives 
to those petitioners with adequate levels of income. In short, the 
"public charge" provision has served to ensure not only that family­
based immigrants impose l ittle burden on the public sector but also 
that the formal right to petition for low-income family members i s  
l ikely to prove valuable in effect only for immigrants with relatively 
high incomes. Consequently ,  the availabi l ity of these fami ly-based 
visas serves as an incentive for skilled aliens in particular to choose to 
accept employment and residence in the United States. 
In 1 996,  Congress imposed sti l l  more stringent requirements for 
family sponsorship that wil l  further l imit access to these visas and wil l  
tend to  reserve them for sponsors with relatively high incomes.  The 
I l legal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibil ity Act of 1 996 
requires virtually all fami ly-based immigrants to submit an affidavit of 
support.82 An affidavit of support must now be a contract enforceable 
against the sponsor not only by the sponsored alien but also by a 
federal , state, or local agency seeking reimbursement for benefits 
80 See N RC, supra note 1 9, at 3 3 9. 
8 1  See. e g , Kohama, 1 7 1 .  & N .  Dec. 2 5 7  ( 1 978).  
8� The new law states that any al ien seeking adm i ss ion as a fam i ly-based i m m i grant, with 
only very narrow exceptions, i s  inadmiss ib le  unless the al ien ' s  sponsor executes an affidav i t  
of support. See I l legal Immigration Reform and I mmigrant Responsibi l ity Act  of  1 996, Pub. 
L. No. 1 04-208. sec . 53 1 (a),  § 2 1 2(a)(4)(C), 1 1 0 Stat. 3 009-546, 647 (cod i fi ed at 8 U .S .C § 
1 1 82(a)(4)(C) ( Supp. I I  1 996)).  
. ,  ' 
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provided to the sponsored alien under a means-tested entitlement 
program. 83 The affidavit must bind the sponsor "to provide support to 
maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less than 
1 2 5 percent of the Federal poverty line. "84 The sponsor must 
demonstrate "the means to maintain" at least this level of income for 
"a family unit of a size equal to the number of members of the 
sponsor' s  household ( including family and non-family dependents) 
plus the total number of other dependents and aliens sponsored by that 
sponsor. "85 
These requirements wil l  not only improve sti l l  further the effect of 
fami ly-based immigrants on public coffers but also deter or preclude 
those of modest means from sponsoring relatives for immigration.86 
These requirements also ensure that the avai labi l ity of fami ly-based 
immigration visas wil l  prove most valuable for the immigrants with 
the most wealth, because the number of relatives an immigrant can 
sponsor will be directly related to the immigrant ' s  wealth. 
Furthermore, the legal ly binding obl igations entailed by sponsorship 
will ensure that immigrants wil l  sponsor only those relatives with 
83  See 8 U .S C .  § 1 1 83a ( S upp.  I I 1 996 ) . Furthermore. under wel fare l eg is lat ion enacted by 
Con gress that same year. if the i m m igrant benefic iary of such an affi davit  l ater app l i es for 
··any Federal means-tested publ ic  benefits," then the imm igrant 's  income and resources shal l  
be "deemed" to include the i ncome and resources of the sponsor. unt i l  the benefic iary either 
obtains U.S .  c i tizensh ip or  has worked for a sufficient period of t ime ("40 q ual i fy ing 
q uarters'') .  Personal Responsibi l i ty and Work Opportunity Reconc i l i at ion Act. sec .  42 L Pub.  
L. No.  1 04- 1 93 .  1 1 0 Stat. 2 1 05 , 2270 (cod i fi ed at  8 U . S.C. § 1 63 1  ( Supp. I I  1 996)) .  Thus, 
"deemi ng·· w i l l  render otherwise e l ig ib le immigrants ine l igible for public benefits. 
84 8 US. C.  § 1 1 83a(a)( l ) (A) ( Supp. I I  1 996). 
8 5  !d § l l 83a(f)( l )( E). (6)(A)( i i i ) .  The law al lows a sponsor who fai l s  to meet th i s  
requ i rement to  recruit another sponsor who can sat isfy the  requi rement by  accept ing jo int  and 
several l iab i l ity. !d § 1 1 83a(f)(2), ( 5 ) .  Th i s  legal l i abi l i ty. however. i s  l i kely to deter al l  but 
c lose relat ives from serving as sponsors. See Charles Wheeler. The New Af idavit of Support 
and Sponsorship Requirements, 74 I NTERPRETER RELEASES 1 5 8 1 ,  1 59 1  ( Oct. 20, 1 997)  ("( l) t  
is  doubtful that many non-relatives wou ld agree to  a request to  be a co-sponsor, g i ven the 
potent i al l iabi l ity that co-sponsors would be assum i ng .
.. 
) . 
86 Pre l i m inary research sponsored by the Imm igration and Natural ization Serv i ce found 
that 30% of those who sponsored relat i ves for imm igration in  1 994 had i ncomes below the 
new standard. See Celia W .  Dugger, Immigrant Study Finds lvfany Below New Income Limit, 
N . Y .  TIMES, Mar. 1 6, 1 997, § I ,  at I .  Another study by the Urban Inst i tute found that 40% of 
i m mi grant fam i l i es and 26% of natives in  the Un ited States in  1 993 h ad i ncomes below the 
new standard. See id. 
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whom they have close ties. Immigrants will choose to sponsor only 
when they consider family reuni fication very valuable and only when 
the welfare of the sponsored relative matters a great deal to the 
sponsor. Thus, legal l iabi l ity wil l  restrict sponsorship of indigent 
immigrants to those cases in which family-based immigration wil l  
provide the most valuable  incentive for the sponsor to  immigrate. 
Although restrictionists have proposed drastic cuts in  fami ly-based 
immigration, citing the national interest,87 these cuts may in fact 
reduce the economic welfare of natives by reducing the incentives for 
skil led immigration and by excluding valuable workers and taxpayers . 
Indeed, given the alternative of qualitative restrictions l ike the "public 
charge" inadmissibil ity ground as a device for regulating immigration, 
i t  is doubtful that quantitative restnct10ns on family-based 
immigration serve a useful purpose at al l in the pursuit of national 
economic welfare. Liberalization or elimination of these quotas would 
probably serve the national economic interest better than cuts in these 
quotas . 
Liberalized quotas would serve the interests of natives not only by 
increasing the immigration of valuable workers and taxpayers but also 
by allowing individual immigrants to enter sooner and thereby 
increasing the total economic contribution made by each immigrant . 
Quotas currently create backlogs of mil l ions of family-based 
immigrants waiting for as long as ten years or more to enter the United 
States.88 The National Research Counci l  found that immigrants 
arr1vmg at earl ier ages make a sign i ficantly larger net fiscal 
contribution overall because they will spend more of their working 
8 7 The Jordan Commission. for example.  recommended the compl ete e l i m ination o f  most 
fam i l y-based admission categories. inc lud i ng not only s ib l ings of U . S .  c i t izens but also adult 
sons and daughters of U . S. c i t izens and of legal permanent residents. See JORDAN COMM 'N, 
supra note I 0. at 70-7 1 .  The S m ith and S i mpson b i l l s  sought to i m p lement these 
recommendations. See H . R. 2202, supra note 1 5 ;  S. 1 394, supra note 1 5 . 
88 For examp le, as of January 1 997, 1 . 5 m i l l ion s ib l ings of U . S. c i t izens were on the 
waiting l ist  for immigrant v isas, and those currently e l igib le  to enter app l ied at l east I 0 years 
ago. See C I R, supra note 1 7, at 66. Sib !  ing immigrants from oversubscribed countries had to 
wait even longer: those adm itted fro m  the Ph i l ipp ines, for example, app l ied nearly 20 years 
ago. See id. 
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l ives--and thus pay more taxes--in the United States.89 Perversely, the 
U .S .  Commission on Immigration Reform has cited the backlogs for 
fami ly-based immigrant visas as a reason to el iminate most categories 
of fami ly-based immigration rather than as a reason to el iminate or 
liberal ize the quotas.90 Liberal ized quotas would reduce these 
backlogs, improve the fiscal impact of the average family-based 
immigrant, and would be more l ikely to promote the economic welfare 
of natives than the Commission' s  proposals .  The Commission' s  
restrictionist proposals seem particularly misguided, given the 
important changes in 1 996 in the requirements for family sponsorship 
and in immigrant access to public benefits. Both sets of changes are 
likely to improve the fiscal effects of the average family-based 
immigrant .9 1  
Indeed, the new income test for fami ly sponsorship sweeps so 
broadly that it applies to the sponsor regardless of the characteristics 
of the sponsored immigrant. Thus, the test seems over-broad and 
unduly rigid in that it wi l l  preclude the immigration of valuable 
workers and taxpayers simply because their  sponsors have insufficient 
income. A test that would serve the interests of natives better would 
exempt sponsors from this test if the sponsored immigrant i s  l ikely to 
have a net positive effect on the public sector. For example,  the 
National Research Counci l  found that once we take account of the 
fiscal impact of an immigrant' s  descendants, the average immigrant 
with at least a high-school education wi l l  have a positive fiscal 
effect.92 Simi larly, the Council also found that the average immigrant 
who arrives at age 40 or younger wil l  have a positive fiscal effect.93 A 
89 See N RC, supra note 1 9, at 3 28-35:  see also C l R, supra note 1 7, at 66 (noting the 
'·extended waiting periods" for i m migrant visas for s ib l ings of U . S .  c it izens, which · ·mean that 
most s ib l ings enter wel l into their working l ives, l imiting the t ime d uring which they can m ake 
a contribution to the U . S .  economy") .  
90 See C l R, supra note 1 7, at 6 6  (c i t ing "the extraord inari ly l arge waiting l ist for s ib l ings of 
U . S. c it izens, and to a l esser extent, adult chi ldren" and concluding that · • [a] n  end to extended 
[family] v isa categories is  j usti fied'') .  
9 1  By d isqual ifYing many sponsors. the changes in sponsorsh ip  rules are l ikely both to 
reduce fami ly-based visa backlogs and to create "a rel atively wealthier m ix" o f  fam i ly-based 
imm igrants. Whee l er, supra note 85, at 1 59 1 .  
92 See N RC, supra note 1 9, at 3 3 4  (Table 7 .5 ) .  
9 3  See id at  335 .  
r ,  
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l iberalized rule that admitted young or educated immigrants regardless 
of the incomes of their sponsors would be more closely tailored to the 
national interest. 
III. INCO M E  DIST RI BUTION AMONG NATIVES 
The policies described above would maximize the total economic 
benefits for natives from immigration. While I have addressed how to 
maximize the total wealth of natives, I have not addressed the 
distribution of that wealth among natives.  Immigration not only 
expands wealth, but also can have important distributive effects. Those 
natives who must compete with immigrants in the labor market may 
find that immigration reduces their real income. 
Empirical studies, however, consistently find that immigration has 
only a weak effect on native wages.94 This result may not be 
surprising, given that natives and immigrants tend to work in different 
occupations and therefore tend not to compete in the same labor 
markets .95 Thus, immigration does have a more significant effect on 
the wages of earl ier waves of immigrant workers, who are c lose 
substitutes for new immigrants.96 
94 See id at 223 ( surveying the empirical studies and observ ing a ··numerica l l y  weak 
relat ionship between native wages and immigration . . .  across all types of native workers. 
wh ite and black. sk i l led and unski l led, male and female"); Bo�jas. Economics of Immigration. 
supra n ote 3 3 ,  at 1 697 ( same): F riedberg & Hunt, supra note 54.  at 42 ( ""Despite the popular 
bel ief that immi grants h ave a large adverse impact on the wages and emp loyment 
opportun ities of the native-born population. the l i terature on this  question does not provide 
much support for this  concl usion ' ') .  
95 See N RC. supra note 1 9, at 2 1 8  ( observing that immigrants arc concentrated in 
occupations '"at both the h igh and the low end o f  the educational d istribution" and concluding 
that '"the data suggest that the jobs o f  immi grant and nati ve workers are d i fferent") .  
9 6  See id at  223 ( "'The one group that appears to su ffer s ign i ti cant negat ive e ffects from 
new immigrants are earl ier waves of immigrants, according to many studies.") .  Borj as c la ims :  
· · I ron ical ly, even though the debate over i m migrat ion pol icy views the poss ib i l ity that 
immigrants lower the wage of native workers as a harm fu l  consequence o f  i m migration, the 
economi c  benefits from i m mi grat ion arise only when immigrants do lower the wage o f  nati ve 
workers . .. Borjas. Economic Benefits from Immigration, supra note 23, at 1 0- 1 1 .  This c la im, 
however, refers only to the immigration surplus enj oyed by nati ves through the pri vate sector 
in labor markets with native workers. I f  on ly  imm igrant workers take certain j obs, then 
• 
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On the other hand, even if present levels of immigration have l ittle 
effect on native wages in the United States, a more l iberal immigration 
policy could produce more significant effects .97 Thus, much of the 
support for immigration restriction is  protectionist in nature : 
restrictionists often cite the need to protect U .S .  workers from foreign 
competition. The requirement of labor certification, in particular, is 
designed to ensure that immigrants do not "take jobs away" from U.S .  
workers or  drive down their wages. 
If  we wish to protect workers from these distributive effects, 
however, the appropriate response is not protectionism but 
redistribution. Optimal policies would l iberalize immigration insofar 
as it increases the total wealth of natives .  As long as immigration 
increases total wealth, then those who gain from immigration can 
compensate those who lose and sti l l  be better off That i s ,  those who 
gain by paying lower wages, or by buying products and services at 
lower cost, can afford to pay enough to compensate those who find 
their wages fal l  relative to prices. Redistributive policies can shift the 
costs of l iberalized immigration to the beneficiaries of l iberal ization. 
This redistribution would produce some costly distortions, but the 
deadweight loss of protectionism would be greater than the 
deadweight loss from redistributive taxes .  That is ,  protectionism is 
less efficient than the tax system in producing a desirable distribution 
of income. 98 For example, if the immigration of guestworkers reduces 
the wages of unskil led workers, then raising taxes on those with higher 
natives can gain from i m m igrat ion in these markets without driving down the wages of any 
nat ive workers. See N RC, supra note 1 9 .  at 220 (' "[T]he economic benefits of i mmigration 
that operate only through lower prices. w ithout d isplacing or d i sadvantaging competit ive 
domestic l abor. add to the positive effects of i mmigration. ' ' ) .  Furthermore, if i mmigrants 
generate a benefit for the publ ic  sector in the form of tax revenues, then natives can gai n from 
i m migrat ion even i f  there i s  no e ffect on wages at a l l .  
9 7  See N RC, supra note 1 9, a t  220 (explaining that the  wage e ffects o f  i m m i gration are 
small  in part because '·the aggregate i ncrease in the supply of labor caused by imm igration is  
itse lf  smal l"). 
98  We can al ways replace an econom ical ly inefficient rule with an effic ient rule without 
making any income c lass worse off, prov ided that we make the appropriate adjustments in 
i ncome taxes. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavel l ,  Why the Legal System is Less Efficient 
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 ( 1 994); Steven. 
Shave l l .  A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Ru/emaking· Should 
Distributional Equity lvfal/er Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 7 1  AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & 
PROC. 4 1 4  ( 1 98 1  ) . 
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incomes and reducing taxes on those with the lowest can leave all 
c lasses of natives better off than they would be in the absence of 
immigration.99 We can achieve this redistribution by expanding 
programs already in use under the existing U .S .  income tax system:  we 
could increase the earned income tax credit and l iberalize its e l igibi l ity 
requirements, for example, to supplement the income of the working 
poor if l iberal ized immigration drives down their real wages. We can 
thereby reduce deadweight loss whi le  stil l  redistributing the same 
wealth that we currently redistribute through costly protectionism. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR RE FORM 
Current immigration restrictions bear l ittle resemblance to those 
that would maximize national economic welfare . The pursuit of thi s  
objective would probably entai l levels of employment-based and 
fami ly-based immigration higher than al lowed by current laws. Given 
that the promotion of the interests of natives alone may seem 
offensive, however, because we do not truly believe that the welfare of 
immigrants should count for nothing, what normative implications can 
we draw from the preceding analysis for the reform of existing 
immigration laws? There are some l iberal izing reforms that appear 
l ikely to improve matters compared to our current immigration laws, 
whether our measure of social welfare includes the interests of natives 
alone or includes the interests of immigrants as wel l .  L iberal izing 
reforms that serve the interests of not only immigrants but also U . S .  
natives may stand the best chance of adoption, especially i f  we pursue 
such reforms in modest increments. Thus, I present these proposals 
not as ideal reforms but as the l iberal izing reforms that seem most 
l ikely to prove political ly feasible. 
First, we should l iberal ize or el iminate our quotas on skil led 
immigrants and el iminate the "labor certification" requirements which 
impose protectionist restrictions on their immigration. We should also 
l iberalize our quotas on fami ly-based immigration, subj ect to the 
99 See Barry R. Ch iswick, Illegal Immigration and Immigration Control, J. ECON. PERSP., 
S um mer 1 988, at 1 0 1 , 1 07 .  
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"public charge" inadmissibi l ity ground, which provides an efficient 
incentive for skil led immigration while protecting publ ic coffers . 
Furthermore, we should l iberalize requirements for sponsorship of 
fami ly-based immigrants so that young and educated immigrants are 
not excluded based solely on the income of their sponsors . Skil led 
immigration is  in the interests of U .S .  natives as well as of the 
immigrants. 
Second, we should l iberal ize our existing guestworker programs so 
as to allow more unskil led aliens to work in the United States .  We 
should eliminate "labor cert ification" requirements for guestworkers, 
which raise protectionist barriers to their employment. We should also 
l iberalize our quotas on these admissions, our restrictions on the 
duration of their employment, and our l imits on the length of their stay 
in the United States as workers. A l iberal ized guestworker program 
would be in the economic interest of natives as wel l  as in  the interest 
of the guestworkers. One question regarding national economic 
welfare arises with respect to the costs unskil led immigrants might 
impose through the public sector. To the extent this cost i s  a concern, 
the appropriate response would be fiscal : discriminatory fiscal pol icies 
can ensure that guestworkers impose no net external costs. Even with 
such discriminatory features, a l iberalized guestworker program would 
be an improvement for the many aliens excluded by existing laws. 
Unski l led guestworkers also raise an i ssue with respect to the 
distribution of income among natives, but again the appropriate 
response is fiscal : to compensate unskil led native workers for any 
reduction in their real wages, Congress could combine immigration 
reforms with tax rel ief for the working poor, such as expansions in the 
earned income tax credit. 
Why has the United States not moved toward such policies? Part 
of the problem may be the xenophobia and intolerance that have 
unfortunately always exerted a powerful influence on the formulation 
of immigration policies. Part of the explanation may be the same 
protectionist pressures generated by special interest groups that oppose 
l iberal ized trade in goods: those who fear foreign competition lobby 
for protectionist barriers. Unskil led native workers, for example, may 
oppose the immigration of guestworkers . To the extent Congress l inks 
a l iberal ized guestworker program with subsidies for the working 
.. ' 
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poor, however, progressive tax refom1s designed to compensate 
unski l led labor could help overcome opposition to l iberal ization . 
The United States might also employ the same device used in the 
international trade context to overcome the protectionist opposition to 
l iberalizing reforms :  multi lateral agreements in which each country 
agrees to reduce trade barriers in exchange for l iberalization by others .  
The prospect of  reciprocal l iberalization by  our trading partners 
mobil izes domestic producer interests in support of the agreement that 
can offset the domestic producer interests opposed to l iberalization of 
our policies .  Through such agreements, each country can gain not 
only by obtaining access to foreign markets but also by overcoming 
protectionism at home and opening its own market. 
So far, the United States has appl ied a double  standard to the 
l iberal ization of trade in services : 
A lthough at the level of general pri nc ip le  the U nited States 
espoused the idea that negotiat ions on services should have 
comp rehensive scope, the US posit ion on the definit ion of serv ices 
themselves had the effect of focusing the negot i at ions on those 
sectors of most export interest to the U nited States and other 
developed countries (e.g. cross-border transactions i n  sectors such 
as te lecomm un ications and financi al serv ices), whi l e  exc l ud i ng 
l i bera l ization of factor movements, espec ia l ly l abour, where 
developing countries m i ght often have a comparat ive advantage 
(e.g. sh ip 's  crews, construction gangs, etc .) . 100 
In the initial negotiations over the GATS, the United States fai led in 
its efforts to obtain a "hard" agreement along GATT l ines, with 
general ly binding obl igations, including a "national treatment" 
obligation, which would prohibit discrimination against foreign 
suppliers of services. 1 0 1 
To promote more comprehensive l iberalization in  the future, the 
United States could agree to p lace its own immigration policies 
regarding temporary workers on the negotiating table under the 
100 TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 2, at 226.  
1 0 1  See Hoekman, supra note 2 ,  at 925.  
I 
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auspices of the GATS. 102 In exchange for commitments by the United 
States regarding temporary workers, labor-abundant developing 
countries may be more inclined to agree to l iberalize thei r  markets for 
services in which the United States has a comparative advantage. 1 03 
The United States would gain not only by reforming its own 
immigration l aws, but also by obtaining commitments by developing 
countries that they have been reluctant to make thus far (such as a 
"national treatment" obligation for services) .  
Negotiations would provide a j ustification for our fai lure to adopt 
more l iberal immigration laws. Whereas in an ideal world we might 
adopt more efficient laws, we currently l ive in a highly nonideal world 
in which other governments discriminate against our nationals (in their 
goods markets, service markets, labor markets, or capital markets) .  
Given this reality, we may use costly policies as bargaining chips, 
offering to reform our protectionist policies in exchange for 
l iberalizing reforms by other governments that discriminate against 
our nationals .  Reforms implemented through a multi lateral agreement 
1 02 See G ATS Annex. supra note 9. para. 3. 33 I . L . M .  at 1 1 88 ( .. Members may negot iate 
spec i fic  commitments applying to the movement o f  all categories o f  natural persons supplying 
services under the Agreement. .. ) ;  Sauve, supra note 2,  at 1 34 ("'The Annex . . .  establ ishes that 
Members may n egotiate speci fic comm itments applying to the temporary entry of a l l  
categories o f  natural persons''). 
The development o f  this Annex was--and remains--of part icu lar i nterest to 
developing countries, given the comparative advantage many of them enjoy in 
labour-intensive servi ces ( e.g. construction services, software development, 
engineering design) .  Recogn ition of the fact that most developed countries had 
not inc luded categories of greatest i nterest to developing-co untry exporters led 
to the adoption of a Min isterial Decision cal l i ng  for negotiations to continue 
beyond the conclusion o f  the U ruguay Round and aimed at achieving h i gher 
levels o f  commitments by GATS Members. 
Sauve. supra note 2.  at 1 35 .  
1 03 The government of a country sending workers to the Uni ted States would perceive a 
benefit  from l iberal ized guestworker po l ic ies as long as it remains concerned about the 
wei fare o f  these workers. Furthermore, even if that government no longer regarded such 
workers as its constituents, the tendency o f  m igrant workers to send remittances back home to 
help support friends and fam i ly  left beh ind would represent an important benefit for the 
country o f  emigration.  For example, a recent study esti mated that Mexican migrants in  the 
U n ited States send between $2 .5  b i l l ion and $3 . 9  b i l l i on per year back home to Mexico, the 
equ ivalent o f  about hal f the d i rect forei gn i nvestment in  Mexico. See Sam D i l lon. U S ­
Mexico Study Sees Exaggeration of Migration Data, N . Y .  TIMES, Aug. 3 1 ,  1 997. § I .  at I ,  6 .  
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would allow each participant to increase its national economic wel fare 
whi le improving global economic welfare. 
